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1. Introduction
This is a paper on earnings mobility in Argentina during the macroeconomic 
growth and contractions that have characterized that nation’s economy from 1996 to the 
present. Since 1996, real GDP growth has fluctuated widely: 
 
Real GDP Growth Rate, Second Quarter to Second Quarter 
 
Year Real GDP Growth Rate  
1996-97 +8.1% 
1997-98 +6.9% 
1998-99 -4.9% 
1999-2000 -0.4% 
2000-2001 -0.2% 
2001-2002 -13.5% 
2002-2003 7.7% 
 
For most of the 1990s, Argentina was seen as a model of successful policymaking. 
Having pegged its exchange rate to the dollar under a currency board type arrangement in 
1991, Argentina had succeeded in ending hyperinflation, reducing inflation rates to 
single-digit levels. Greater economic stability attracted foreign investment inflows, 
contributing to an acceleration in economic growth; indeed, even as lenders withdrew 
their financing in East Asia in 1997, capital inflows continued to Argentina. Then, 
Argentina entered into a prolonged recession. The combination of the hard peg of the 
local currency to the U.S. dollar and excessive borrowing led to an unsustainable fiscal 
situation and, ultimately, to the collapse of the economy at the end of 2001 (See Figure 
1). Gross Domestic Product fell by 13.5 percent from the second quarter of 2001 to the 
second quarter of 2002, and the share of the population in poverty reached 58 percent in 
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October 2002, versus 38 percent in October 2001, according to the official moderate 
poverty line.1  
This paper addresses the distributional consequences of these macroeconomic 
events. (Note: Here and throughout the paper, “distribution of income” means the entire 
density or cumulative distribution function; it does not mean “inequality.”) Who 
benefited the most from Argentine economic growth? Who lost the most in economic 
decline? Are those who started rich getting richer in growth periods and losing more in 
recessionary periods, or is it the other way around? Are the answers to these questions the 
same for all measures of initial advantage? 
We adopt the perspective of pro-poor growth in this paper.2 The weakest 
definition is that growth is pro-poor if poverty falls when growth takes place (Kraay, 
2003). A somewhat stronger definition is that pro-poor growth takes place if the poor 
enjoy the same proportionate increases in income or consumption as do others 
(Ravallion, 2004). Stronger yet is the notion that growth is pro-poor if poverty falls by 
more than it would have if all incomes had grown at the same rate (Baulch and 
McCulloch, 2000; Kakwani and Pernia, 2000; Duclos and Wodon, 2004). Strongest of all 
is to see to it that the poorest 20% of the population gets 20% of the benefits (Harberger, 
1998; Summers, 1998.) 
What is novel about this analysis compared with virtually all previous work on 
Argentina is that it is based on a series of panels of individual workers. For each one-year 
period from 1996-1997 through 2002-2003, we examine the change in labor market 
earnings for the same individuals from May of one year to May of the next. The data set 
covers workers in twenty-eight cities in Argentina. Analyzing changes for the same 
                                                 
1 GDP numbers from INDEC; poverty numbers from Gasparini (2004). The official moderate poverty line 
is based on the cost of a basic food basket and non-food consumption bundle whose combined values are 
just sufficient to allow a typical to achieve a minimum level of material welfare. It is set at a higher level 
than US$2 a day at PPP and is constant in real terms. 
 
2 The analysis is limited to urban Argentina for reasons of data availability. 
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people contrasts fundamentally with the great bulk of the previous literature in Argentina, 
which is based not on panels but on comparable cross-sections. Mobility provides a better 
measure of changing opportunities than do traditional measures of inequality. Measures 
of inequality are like snapshots; they reflect differences in income at a specific point in 
time. Researchers who have studied distributional change in Argentina have looked at 
anonymous individuals and households: those in the poorest 20% of the income 
distribution versus others, men versus women, and so on. They have not, however, 
looked at the same individuals and households, following them and gauging changes in 
their economic circumstances over time. These studies can say nothing about the earnings 
changes of the initially poor or rich individuals, such as whether those at the top or 
bottom of the income ladder are moving up or down or expect to do so. To investigate if 
pro-poor income changes occurred in countries with rising cross-sectional income 
inequality, one can measure changes in individual earnings directly. 
To learn about earnings changes for identified individuals during years of growth 
and recession, we study the variations in patterns of individual earnings changes over 
seven one-year panels in twenty-eight cities in Argentina. For a sample of women and 
men aged 25-60, we analyze earnings changes both in an unconditional way in a 
univariate framework and in a conditional way using multiple regression. The emphasis 
is given to how earnings changes relate to individuals’ initial economic position. We test 
whether the initially most advantaged individuals are the ones gaining the most in booms 
and losing the most in busts in Argentina.  
One major conclusion that we reach from our panel data analysis is that the 
pattern of changes is much more progressive than would appear from the more standard 
cross-sectional analysis. Most importantly, we find that both in positive growth periods 
and in negative growth periods, those who start in the least advantaged positions to begin 
with enjoy the most positive changes in pesos, not just in percentages. This finding runs 
precisely counter to the view held by many that the poor are the big losers in recessions; 
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as one recent survey article put it, “there is quite a lot of evidence that poorer households 
may be less able than richer ones to protect themselves against adverse effects or to take 
advantage of positive opportunities created by policy reform.” (Winters, McCulloch, and 
McKay, 2004, p. 107). 
A second major conclusion that we reach concerns the patterns of earnings 
changes in good times and bad. Our seven panels include three positive-growth years and 
four negative-growth years. A naïve view, which we term the "symmetry hypothesis," 
holds that those who gain the most when the economy is growing are those who lose the 
most when the economy is contracting.3 , 4  However, we find that this hypothesis is 
decisively rejected for urban Argentina. Rather, our results show that when there are 
significant differences between groups, those who gain the most when the economy is 
growing are also those who gain the most or lose the least when the economy is 
contracting. In other words, the pattern of changes is structural and not symmetric. 
Our third major conclusion is about the determinants of earnings changes in 
Argentina. The explanatory variables available for this analysis are initial earnings, 
gender, age, education, sector of employment, and geographic region. As explained 
further in Section 5, a variable is judged to be statistically significant using standard t 
tests or F tests; it is judged to be economically significant if it explains one percent or 
more of the variance in earnings changes. Surprisingly, not all of the explanatory 
variables are statistically significant determinants of earnings change all the time, even in 
a sample of more than fifty thousand workers. Moreover, among the variables that are 
statistically significant, some are economically insignificant. To summarize the results 
presented below: the variables that are both statistically and economically significant 
                                                 
3 Reasons for expecting the symmetry hypothesis to hold are presented in Section 3. 
 
4 This symmetry hypothesis is different from the one that holds that cyclical downturns have an asymmetric 
effect on poverty: recessions tend to increase poverty rates significantly, but expansions tend to have a 
more limited effect (Agénor, 2002). 
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determinants of earnings change are initial earnings and sector transition; the variables 
that are mostly statistically significant but economically insignificant are gender, age, and 
education; and the variable that is mostly statistically insignificant and always 
economically insignificant is geographic region. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the notion of 
economic mobility and how it differs from inequality and poverty. Section 3 presents the 
theoretical foundations for ideas concerning divergence of earnings and symmetry of 
mobility. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 the hypotheses and the 
methodologies for testing them. The results for the five hypotheses are presented in 
Section 6, along with evidence on our attempts to predict the major determinants of 
earnings changes. Section 7 deepens the analysis of mobility and inequality, and Section 
8 concludes. 
 
2. Mobility, Inequality, and Poverty
A. An Introduction to Research on Economic Mobility 
This paper presents the results of a mobility study for urban Argentina. Mobility 
studies are of two types. Micromobility studies, of which this paper is one, relate the 
change in a measure of economic well-being to a number of explanatory variables. In this 
study, the measure of economic well-being is the labor market earnings of an individual, 
and the dependent variable in our analysis is the change in labor market earnings.5  The 
explanatory variables used here include base-year income, education, gender, sector of 
employment, and other time-varying and time-invariant characteristics.  By contrast, 
macromobility studies gauge how much mobility there is in an economy as a whole, often 
comparing differences in aggregate mobility over time or for different groups. As an 
                                                 
5 Other measures of economic well-being in other mobility studies include changes in total income, log-
income, or consumption on a household, per-capita, or adult-equivalent basis as well as changes in 
economic position (such as decile or quintile). 
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aggregate measure, macro-mobility is like macro-growth (how much economic growth an 
economy has in aggregate), macro-unemployment (how much unemployment an 
economy has in aggregate), and macro-poverty (how much poverty an economy has in 
aggregate.)6  
The study of earnings and income micro-mobility has a long tradition in 
economics; for a survey of empirical studies, see Atkinson et al. (1992).  However, due to 
the lack of panel data surveys, mobility studies have been until recently confined to 
developed countries.  
The study of mobility patterns in developing countries’ labor markets is still a 
fresh area of research where much remains to be learned; for reviews of the developing 
country literature, see Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) and Fields (2001). In many 
developing country studies, questions about convergence of income over time have been 
asked and answered by regressing change in economic position on base year economic 
position with no other variables present. It has been shown that household incomes 
sometimes converge towards the grand mean, sometimes diverge away from it, and 
sometimes do neither (Fields et al., 2003a). Only one panel is analyzed for each country 
in the aforementioned paper. As in the case of studies of mobility in developed countries, 
we do not find in in the developing country studies a careful comparison of various 
panels over time, which is required in an analysis of changing earnings dynamics in 
growth and recession.  
In the case of Latin America, to the extent that earnings gains and losses of 
different income groups have been studied for periods of growth and recession in the 
                                                 
6 Many macro-mobility concepts and measures are being used in the literature. The six concepts can be classified into 
six categories: (1) Time-independence, which asks how dependent current earnings are on past earnings; (2) Positional 
movement, which gauges how many quintiles, deciles, centiles, or ranks an individual moves; (3) Share movement, 
which measures changes in individuals’ shares of total earnings; (4) Non-directional income movement, also called 
income flux, which measures the amplitude of earnings changes in absolute value; (5) Directional income movement, 
which measures the changes in earnings or log earnings in algebraic value; and (6) Mobility as an equalizer of longer 
term income, which compares the inequality of earnings over two or more periods with the inequality of base-year 
earnings. 
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region, the answers are based on comparable cross sections (IDB, 1999; Lustig and 
Székely, 1999; De Ferranti et al., 2004; Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig, 2004). 
Specifically for Argentina, earnings changes have been mostly analyzed in different 
macroeconomic conditions using cross-sectional data (Altimir and Beccaria, 2000 and 
2001, Gasparini et al. 2001, Gasparini 2004, Damill et al., 2002). In this way, researchers 
have looked at anonymous individuals and households: those in the poorest 20% of the 
income distribution versus others, men versus women, and so on. They have not, 
however, looked at the same individuals and households, following them and gauging 
changes in their economic circumstances over time. These studies can say nothing about 
the earnings changes of the initially poor or rich individuals. 
To the best of our knowledge, no study comparing the patterns of earnings 
mobility in years of growth and recession has been done for Argentina or any other 
country, other than a parallel project in which we are participating (Fields et al., 2004). 
This study thus breaks new ground in the mobility literature as a whole. 
 
B.  Mobility, Poverty, and Inequality Are Three Distinct Concepts
The relationship between mobility, inequality, and poverty, merits some 
explanation. Our main point in the following paragraphs is that because these are 
logically distinct concepts, one does not imply anything about the other.  
Consider first the relationship between mobility and inequality. Suppose we have 
an economy that consists of two individuals whose initial incomes are $1 and $5 
respectively. Write this as the vector (1, 5). Suppose that the economy does not grow, so 
that later the anonymous income distribution remains (1, 5). Clearly, inequality is 
unchanged. But has there been mobility? With anonymous data, which typical cross-
sections are, we simply cannot tell. There are, however, two underlying possibilities: 
denoting the two individuals by α and β, the underlying pattern for named individuals is 
either 
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I: (1, 5) ? (1, 5) 
    α, β        α, β 
or it is  
II: (1, 5) ? (5, 1) . 
     α, β         α, β 
In Case I, there has been no income mobility, while in the second case there has been. 
Yet in both cases, inequality is unchanged. This exemplifies how mobility and inequality 
are distinct concepts. 
 Next, consider the relationship between mobility and poverty. The distributional 
changes  
I: (1, 5) ? (2, 5) 
    α, β        α, β 
and 
III: (1, 5) ? (1, 6) 
       α, β        α, β 
both exhibit upward mobility. If, as is reasonable in this example, we take the poverty 
line to be somewhere between $1 and $5, poverty measures that are sensitive to income 
gains among the poor such as the Pα class for α > 0 (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984) 
and the Sen poverty index (Sen, 1966) show a fall in poverty in Case I and not in Case 
III. This example demonstrates that mobility and poverty are distinct concepts. 
 Finally, consider the relationship between inequality and poverty. Suppose the 
pattern of distributional change is such that the poorer person’s income doubles while the 
richer person’s income triples: 
IV: (1, 5) ? (2, 15). 
       α, β         α, β 
Because the poor person’s income has risen, poverty again falls (unless the poverty line is 
above $2 and the poverty headcount is used). Yet, Lorenz curves and all Lorenz-
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consistent inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient register an increase in 
inequality. This example shows that inequality and poverty are not the same thing. 
 
 C.  Past Literature on Mobility, Poverty, and Inequality in the Case of 
Argentina 
Turning now to the case of Argentina, inequality has been rising, sometimes 
slowly and sometimes rapidly, over a long period of time. Sánchez Puerta (2004) presents 
a detailed review of the relevant studies. The increase in inequality has been documented 
in a number of studies: Altimir and Beccaria (2000), Altimir and Beccaria (2001), Damill 
et al. (2002), Gasparini (2004), Gasparini et al. (2004), Gasparini and Walter Sosa 
Escudero (1999), De Ferranti et al. (2004). Our own calculations produce the following 
series on inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient: 7
 
Gini Coefficient of Labor Earnings Inequality by Year 
 
Year Gini Coefficient 
1996 0.4908 
1997 0.4808 
1998 0.5014 
1999 0.5008 
2000 0.5176 
2001 0.5246 
2002 0.5806 
2003 0.5296 
                                                 
7 These are the Gini coefficients of labor market earnings for panel individuals aged 25-60 when they are 
observed in the second year. The data are described further in Section 4. 
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For the earlier years, the underlying Lorenz curves are remarkably stable from one year 
to the next. As displayed in Figure 2, inequality changed so little in each year from 1996-
1997 to 2000-2001 that we see only one Lorenz curve, because the base-year curve and 
the final-year curve lie entirely on top of one another. On the other hand, the data also 
show a substantial Lorenz-worsening from 2001 to 2002 and a substantial Lorenz-
improvement from 2002 to 2003.  
As for poverty, according to the official moderate poverty line, the poverty 
headcount ratio decreased in 1996-97 and stabilized until 1999. Then, it increased at an 
increasing rate for three years until it peaked in 2002. After that, it has been decreasing 
with the economic recovery. Sadly, the poverty headcount ratio has not yet fallen to the 
levels of the beginning of the 1990s nor the level of 1997. 
The amount of research on mobility is starting to grow in the Argentina due to 
availability of new data from panel surveys. The major preceding studies are those by 
Wodon (2001), Gutierrez (2004), McKenzie (2004), Corbacho et al. (2003), and 
Menendez and Albornoz (2004).Wodon (2001) analyses income (wages and self-
employment) macromobility and risk during the business cycle in Argentina and Mexico. 
He uses a new measure of mobility, namely the Gini index of mobility, which is a 
function of ranks of individuals in the distribution of income. In Argentina, mobility turns 
out to be higher during recessions and lower during growth compared to Mexico. Even 
though the author focuses on the different patterns of mobility in periods of growth and 
recession, he does not analyze the relationship between earnings changes and initial 
earnings or other measures of initial advantage of the individuals as explanatory variables 
of income dynamics in Argentina. 
Gutierrez (2004) focuses on occupational and wage mobility in urban Argentina 
in the period 1998-2002. He constructs panels for all individuals (including the inactive) 
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using the EPH (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares)8, which is also the data set that we use. 
He studies the determinants of wage mobility (using the concept of time independence, 
i.e., the correlation coefficient between wages at two different points in time) and the 
determinants of finding or losing a job. He finds that low-earnings individuals have more 
wage volatility and more movements into and out of employment. Also, men, the least 
educated, and younger individuals show more wage mobility.  
In a very comprehensive paper about the 2002 financial crisis in Argentina, 
McKenzie (2004) constructs panels using data from the EPHs to assess the adjustments 
of household and individual incomes and the labor market response. He studies changes 
in nominal wages, entry into and exit from the workforce, hours worked, household labor 
supply and work program participation separately. The mobility analysis consists of an 
OLS regression of change in log income on individual characteristics and regions, with 
dummy variable for the period of crisis with interactions. His conclusions are that the 
larger income falls were for males, who were managers, or who changed jobs. Females in 
Cuyo did better than before, while females with tertiary education did worse. Corbacho et 
al. (2003) also use panel data from Argentina for the years 1999 to 2002 and analyze the 
determinants of changes in household income to draw inferences regarding socio-
economic characteristics and vulnerability. They find that households whose heads were 
male, less educated, and employed in the construction sector were more vulnerable to the 
crisis, experiencing larger-than-average declines in income and higher dispersion.  Base-
year income is not included as an explanatory variable in either McKenzie’s or Corbacho 
et al’s regressions as would be usual in the mobility literature, and therefore these results 
are not directly comparable to ours. 
The work that comes closest to ours is Menéndez and Albornoz (2004). The 
authors use the changes in logarithm of household income per capita to determine what 
                                                 
8 EPH (Permanent Household Survey) conducted by INDEC (National Statistical Institute of Argentina) 
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are the principal observed socioeconomic factors driving income dynamics in Argentina. 
For this purpose, they perform multiple regression analysis to test, ceteris paribus, 
whether there are structural patterns in the variables explaining income changes over time 
in their five one-year panels. They do not find any structural patterns for the determinants 
of income change and conclude that shocks affect different types of people over time.  No 
special attention is given to the different patterns in periods of growth or periods of 
recession.  
Our review of the literature for Argentina reveals that the studies that compare 
earnings gains and losses of different income groups in growth and recessionary periods 
focus only on inequality. These analyses are based on comparable cross sections (Altimir 
and Beccaria, 2000 and 2001; Gasparini et al., 2001; Damill et al., 2002; Gasparini, 
2004). In no way does rising income inequality provide evidence that absolute economic 
conditions have worsened for the poor. Rising inequality indicates that the dispersion of 
income has widened, but contains no information on the movement of specific 
individuals within that distribution. If a sufficiently large number of poor and rich 
individuals swap incomes, the initially poor will gain more on average than the initially 
rich, even as the distribution of income grows more unequal. 
To the best of our knowledge, the present study constitutes the first analysis of 
patterns of earnings dynamics comparing periods of positive and negative economic 
growth in any country, developed or developing. Some of the results of this paper appear 
in Fields, Duval, Freije, and Sánchez Puerta (2004), which compares earnings dynamics 
of Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. We find that reported labor earnings in pesos 
consistently converge to the grand mean. Whether in good or bad times, the people at the 
bottom of the reported earnings distribution have the largest earnings gains and the 
people at the top the lowest ones. However, this finding does not always hold when other 
measures of initial well-being are taken into consideration. Our contributions in this 
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paper are to present the Argentine results from the Fields et al. (2004) study and to move 
beyond them in a number of important respects.  
 
3. Theoretical Foundations: Divergence of Earnings and Symmetry of Mobility  
We reported in Section 2 that although earnings inequality was noticeably higher 
in urban Argentina in 2003 than it had been in 1996, in some one-year periods, the 
changes in inequality were essentially nil. The small or zero changes in inequality in 
some years imply that each anonymous income group (e.g., bottom decile, second decile, 
etc.) had the same percentage change in income as every other. Of course, a given 
percentage change produces a larger change in pesos the higher is one’s income. 
Therefore, the anonymous pattern of income changes is one where those who start with 
higher incomes gain the most pesos when the economy is growing and lose the most 
when the economy is contracting. From here, it is only a small step to hypothesize that 
those particular individuals who started with the highest initial incomes are those who 
gain the most pesos in periods of economic growth and lose the most pesos in periods of 
economic decline. And generalizing further, it might be hypothesized that those particular 
groups that gain the most when the economy is growing (men, for example) would be the 
ones that lose the most when the economy is contracting. 
This idea is what we call the “symmetry of mobility” hypothesis. The symmetry 
of mobility hypothesis states that the groups which gain the most in periods of growth are 
the same ones which get hurt the most in recessions. However, as we showed in Section 
2, mobility and inequality imply nothing about the other, so it is not evident that this 
hypothesis will be confirmed in the case of Argentina.  
Other considerations lead to a different conjecture. The “divergent mobility 
hypothesis” holds that the initially-advantaged are the ones that gain the most and lose 
the least, whether in good times or in bad. Several theories underlie this hypothesis. 
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One theory is cumulative advantage, which posits that individuals with higher 
incomes and earnings in the base year experience the largest earnings gains (Merton, 
1968; Boudon, 1973; Huber, 1998). Wealthier individuals’ ownership of physical and 
human capital, access to social and political connections, and greater ability to borrow 
and save could all contribute to cumulative advantage.  
Complementing cumulative advantage in contributing to the divergent mobility 
hypothesis is the notion of poverty traps (Rosenstein-Rodin, 1943; Nurkse, 1953; Nelson, 
1956; Basu, 1997). According to this theory, those individuals who lack a minimum level 
of human, physical, and social assets are consigned to a life in poverty from which they 
cannot escape.  
 A third factor that may contribute to larger gains for the initially well-to-do 
compared with others is labor market twist. This idea holds that in an increasingly 
globalized and technology-dependent world, the demand for skills is outpacing the 
available supply, bidding up the earnings of skilled workers while lowering those of the 
unskilled (Johnson, 1997; Gottschalk, 1997; Topel, 1997). Skill-biased technical change 
would act to propel individuals with the highest human and physical capital endowments 
ahead the most.  
Together, the first three factors reinforce one another. They act to produce a 
pattern which Nobel laureate James Meade (1976, p. 155) called “self-reinforcing 
influences which help to sustain the good fortune of the fortunate and the bad fortune of 
the unfortunate.”  
A fourth factor operates in the opposite direction. According to the model 
proposed by Galton (1889), those who start above the grand mean tend to converge 
downward relatively, while those who start below the grand mean to converge upward 
relatively. Thus, those who have the highest incomes or earnings to start with are the ones 
who gain the least when growth is positive and lose the most when growth is negative.  
We turn now to the data we use to test these hypotheses.  
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4.  Data 
The data for our empirical work come from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
(EPH), an urban household labor force survey conducted by Argentina’s National 
Statistical Agency, INDEC. The survey is a rotating panel, with a quarter of the 
households rotated out each period, so that a given household can be followed up to four 
periods. The survey is conducted in May and October each year in provincial capitals and 
areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants for a total of 28 cities.9  The EPH is 
representative of 71% of urban areas. Since 87% of Argentines live in urban areas, the 
sample of the EPH represents around 62 percent of the total population of the country. 
The EPH is carried out via a two-stage random sample. Within each of the twenty-eight 
city areas, a random sample of geographic units is chosen in the first stage, and then a 
random sample of houses within the selected units is drawn in the second stage. 
The survey contains detailed questions on employment and incomes, together 
with information on household demographics, basic housing questions and questions on 
education.  
For this paper, we take the micro-data for two consecutive years (May to May) to 
avoid capturing changes in earnings due to seasonality. The panels constructed for the 
periods of positive growth (1996-1997, 1997-1998 and 2002-2003) and negative growth 
(1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002) allow for the systematic comparison 
of the years of boom towards the end of last decade and the years of deep recession 
leading to the crisis of early 2002. We match dwellings by an identification code that 
uniquely characterizes each place that is surveyed. Due to the rotating nature of the EPH 
survey, around 50% of the original sample would be expected to not be present in the 
                                                 
9 An additional three areas were added to the survey in October 2002 round. To maintain comparability with earlier 
rounds of the survey, we do not use observations from these new areas. 
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second year. Indeed, this proportion is usually higher, since households that move and are 
not found at the time of the re-interview are not traced but replaced.  
In order to avoid mismatching, additional matches of gender and date of birth of 
the individual are required. Then, if these two variables were missing or were 
misreported for some individuals, the observations could not be matched and were 
dropped from the analysis. Non-random attrition could be a concern given that the final 
samples represent around 35% of the initial surveys, where 50% would correspond to 
zero attrition. Besides, not all the individuals selected to respond the EPH answer the 
questions about earnings. This phenomenon can bias the mobility estimations if (i) non-
response depends on income, and (ii) if the percentage of non-response varies over 
time.10  However, past researchers have not found attrition bias to be a serious issue.11  
Sampling weights are provided which correct for non-response in the cross-
section, and allow for population employment and unemployment numbers to be 
calculated. However, we chose to use the unweighted data for the following reasons. The 
weights can vary for the same household from one survey to the next and do not take 
account of attrition in the panel aspect. Furthermore, they need not be representative for 
group-level comparisons, such as comparing informal to formal workers.12
In the empirical work that follows, the dependent variable is the individual’s 
change in labor market earnings. The reason for the choice of change in earnings as the 
variable of interest is that in developing countries including South Africa, Indonesia, 
                                                 
10The number of people with incomplete household income reports was about 25% at the beginning and in the middle 
of the eighties and rose to 28% at the end of that decade. In the nineties the efforts of the INDEC to mitigate the 
problem of non-response succeeded: the percentages fell throughout the decade until they reached an 8% in the 1998 
survey 
11 The first attempts to adjust for non-response in Argentina of which we are aware were done by Gasparini and Sosa 
Escudero (1999) in the context of measures of inequality. They use predictions of an income determination model to 
assign incomes to people who do not answer. In a study of mobility in Greater Buenos Aires, Menendez and Albornoz 
(2004) estimate longitudinal weights using a probit model for the probability of staying in the panels to correct for 
attrition and found that results were not significantly altered by non-systematic attrition. Cruces and Wodon (2002) also 
argue that attrition in the EPH panel does not seem to affect trends in income in a qualitatively important way. 
 
12 Results with weighted data do not alter the conclusions of the paper and are available from the authors upon request. 
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Spain and Venezuela, earnings have been shown to constitute the single most important 
source of variation of change in income, more so than all the other income sources 
combined (Fields et al., 2003b). The paramount role of changes in labor earnings in 
explaining changes in incomes points to the importance of understanding earnings 
dynamics and employment transitions more fully. Therefore, the focus of this paper is on 
analyzing the way in which labor markets distribute rewards. 
The unit of analysis for our labor market study is individuals in the labor force in 
both base and final years of the panel who were between the ages of twenty-five and 
sixty. The age range is restricted in order to avoid interpreting as earnings mobility labor 
market fluctuations due to first time entries to the labor force and retirements. These 
restrictions might not allow the study of some interesting outcomes, such as the added-
worker effect in times of recession, given that observations are dropped if participation in 
the labor force occurs in just one of the two periods of the panel. The focus of the paper is 
on individuals more permanently attached to the labor force.  
 The analyses are conducted using earnings changes in pesos, which measures 
absolute earnings gains. All earnings are expressed in 1999 pesos per month.13  Nominal 
earnings are deflated by the April Consumer Price Indices for Greater Buenos Aires to 
obtain real earnings.14  Earnings include wage or salary, self-employment income, and 
earnings as an owner or employer. 
One explanatory variable used in this study is initial earnings, sometimes in pesos 
and sometimes in quintiles (where quintile 1 is the lowest and quintile 5 is the highest). 
Moreover, we use both reported and predicted initial earnings as variables explaining 
earnings change.15  
                                                 
13 The Argentine peso was pegged to equal one U.S. dollar in that year. 
 
14 Regional price indices are available for other cities, although they are based on a smaller number of 
prices and are not strictly comparable. 
 
15 The predictions are described below. 
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Other explanatory variables are also used. These include gender, age, education, 
sector, and region. Male is a binary variable taking on the value one for men and zero for 
women. Age is grouped into three categories in the mobility profiles; it is entered linearly 
and quadratically in the regressions. Age is age in the first period of the panel; for 
example, age in the panel which combines the May 2002 and May 2003 waves of the 
EPH is the worker’s age as of the May 2002 survey. Education is highest level of 
education reached. It is grouped into three categories in the mobility profiles: primary 
education or less; secondary education (national, commercial, normal or technical 
schools); and tertiary education (superior or university studies). In the regressions, years 
of education are included linearly and quadratically. Sector of employment is grouped 
into three categories (formal, informal, and unemployed) in both base year and final year. 
In Argentina, the formal sector consists of 1) workers who have all legislated benefits 
(pension, paid vacation, etc.), 2) employers in firms with more than five employees, and 
3) self-employed workers with more than a secondary education.  Sector transition is a 
nine-category variable: remaining formal, moving from formal to informal work, etc. In 
the regressions, the omitted category is remaining unemployed. Region is a grouping of 
six geographic areas.  
 
5. Hypotheses and Methods 
Based on the theoretical considerations discussed above, we test five hypotheses 
concerning the patterns of earnings gains and losses in Argentina:  
 
(H1) Divergence of Earnings, Unconditional Version:  In any given year, 
those individuals for whom initial reported earnings level is highest are 
those who experience the largest earnings gains or the smallest earnings 
losses. 
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(H2) Divergence with Other Indicators, Unconditional Version: In any 
given year, those groups that earn the most are those that experience the 
largest earnings gains or the smallest earnings losses. 
 
(H3) Symmetry of Gains and Losses, Unconditional Version: Comparing 
positive growth and negative growth years, those groups for whom 
earnings changes are the most positive when the economy is growing are 
those for whom earnings changes are most negative when the economy is 
contracting. 
 
(H4) Symmetry of Gains and Losses, Conditional Version: Other things 
equal, comparing positive growth and negative growth years, those groups 
for whom earnings changes are the most positive when the economy is 
growing are those for whom earnings changes are most negative when the 
economy is contracting. 
 
(H5) Determinants of Earnings Changes: The conditional determinants of 
earnings changes are the same as the unconditional ones, both in growth 
years and in recessionary years. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between these hypotheses. In these diagrams, 
a measure of welfare in the base year W1 is plotted on the horizontal axis and income 
change  is plotted on the vertical axis. The data would be consistent with 
unconditional divergence if the relationship between 
Y∆
Y∆  and W1 is found to be positive 
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as in panel (a).16 On the other hand, the data could be inconsistent with unconditional 
divergence in any number of ways. One of these is a pattern of unconditional 
convergence, which is illustrated in panel (b).  
Figure 3 also illustrates the tests of symmetry of mobility. In these tests, we use 
alternate measures of W1 as indicated by the following variables: initial reported 
earnings, initial predicted earnings, gender, age, years of education, initial economic 
sector, and region. We will conclude that symmetry holds if the groups that gain the most 
in positive growth years are those that lose the most in negative growth years. The 
diagram in panel (c) of Figure 3 illustrates a kind of symmetry in which it is those with 
the highest initial economic well-being who gain the most in positive growth years and 
lose the most in negative growth years. Symmetry could, however, be rejected in many 
ways. Two ways of rejecting symmetry are illustrated in panels (a) and (b). In panel (a), 
those who start in the best economic position are the ones who gain the most in both 
positive growth and negative growth years; in panel (b), it is those who start in the worst 
economic position who gain the most both when growth is positive and when it is 
negative. 
Unconditional divergence will be said to hold if the relationship between  and 
Y
Y∆
1 is as in panel (a) without controls. Conditional divergence will be said to hold if the 
relationship between  and YY∆ 1 is as in panel (a) with controls. Similarly, unconditional 
symmetry will be said to hold if the relationship between Y∆  and a welfare measure 
other than initial earnings is as in panel (c) without controls. Conditional symmetry will 
be said to hold if the relationship between Y∆ and W1 is as in panel (c) with controls. 
Two methods are used to test the hypotheses. Starting with the unconditional 
analysis, we generate mobility profiles for years of growth and recession. These profiles 
                                                 
16 The top line displays what a divergent relationship would look like in a positive growth year; the bottom 
line displays a a divergent relationship for a negative growth year. 
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give the mean and median earnings change by category, such as quintile of initial 
reported and predicted earnings, age range, and so on. Statistical significance of the 
different factors is also presented, using t tests to determine if an individual variable (e.g., 
Quintile 1) differs significantly from zero and F tests to determine if a group of variables  
(e.g., the five quintile variables taken together) have means that are significantly different 
from one another. As a measure of economic significance, this analysis is supplemented 
with the R-squareds of simple regressions of change in earnings on each of the factors. In 
this paper, a variable is considered economically significant if it explains more than one 
percent of the variation in earnings changes.  
Turning to the conditional analysis, we estimate OLS and median multiple 
regressions. In the regressions, t tests are used to test the statistical significance of a 
single regressor, and F tests are used to test the statistical significance of groups of 
regressors (e.g., the various regional groupings). The economic significance of the 
variables in the conditional analysis is assessed by the share of each factor in accounting 
for the observed inequality of earnings changes. The method proposed by Fields (2003) 
decomposes the observed inequality in earnings and assigns weights to each factor. A 
variable is considered to be economically significant if its share in accounting for 
observed inequality is at least of one percent. 
All of these analyses will be performed on the full sample of workers, on just the 
workers with positive earnings in base and final years, and separately for the formally 
and informally employed. 
The data for one-year mobility are presented in two ways, depending on the 
hypothesis being tested. The tests of unconditional divergence involve a comparison of 
all years from 1996 to 2003. The tests of unconditional and conditional symmetry 
compare all positive growth years pooled together with all negative growth years pooled 
together.  
 
23 
The traditional way of analyzing unconditional mobility is by regressing changes 
in earnings on initial reported earnings. However, there might be a problem of 
measurement error with reported earnings. Therefore, we also perform a robustness test 
by including another measure of initial advantage: initial predicted earnings.  
Throughout this analysis, we assume that there is classical measurement error in 
the measures of earnings.  In other words, the error term is mean zero, normally 
distributed, and independent of any other household or personal characteristics:  
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By running OLS, any reporting error in initial income leads to a spurious negative 
correlation between reported initial earnings and change, captured by the second term of 
the OLS estimate. In addition, the stochastic independent variable causes attenuation bias, 
reflected in the first term of that equation. If true incomes diverge from the mean, so that 
oβ  is positive, the reported regression coefficient unambiguously underestimates the 
extent of that divergence. On the other hand, if true incomes converge to the mean, so 
that oβ  is negative, these effects work in opposite directions and the bias is of 
indeterminate sign. 
To try to overcome the problems associated with reporting error, a two stage least 
squares regression using identifying instruments can be performed. Under the assumption 
that these instruments are orthogonal to reporting error, the estimated IV coefficient  
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is consistent.  
Earnings are predicted by instrumenting the permanent component of earnings, 
which generates a regressor that can be interpreted as a measure of long-term earnings as 
opposed to current earnings. The variables used to make these predictions include the 
individual’s age, education, gender, sector of occupation, and dwelling characteristics 
(dwelling ownership, number of rooms, and a measure of comfort including data on 
sewage, running water, and electricity). 
The prediction of initial earnings y0 is done following several different methods:17
Method 1 consists of predicting y0 with a linear regression based on time-invariant 
characteristics and long-term income proxies. In the case of Argentina, these variables are 
age and its square, education and its square, gender, and dwelling characteristics. 
Method 2 consists of extending the previous prediction by adding to the previous 
list of regressors, dichotomous variables for individuals’ sector in the base year: informal, 
formal, or unemployed. 
Method 3 abandons the linear structure used so far in doing the predictions, and 
instead it generates a predicted y0 by accounting explicitly for the probability of being 
unemployed. In particular, predicted y0 will equal P(y0>0|X)*E(y0|X, y0>0), where the 
components are estimated by a Heckman selectivity correction method. The list of 
variables included in X are the same as in Method 1. Similarly, Method 4 extends 
Method 3 by including the informal sector dummy as an additional regressor in the 
E(y0|X, y0>0) term. 
                                                 
17 Throughout this paper, unless otherwise noted, when we mention initial predicted earnings, we refer to 
earnings predicted by Method 1. 
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Finally, Methods 5 and 6 repeat the linear exercise performed in Methods 1 and 2, 
but obtaining the parameters used for the predictions from linear regressions fit only for 
employed individuals. 
In the analysis that follows, regardless of whether initial reported earnings or 
initial predicted earnings is used as an explanatory variable, the dependent variable is 
always the change in reported earnings. This is because under the above stated 
assumptions the measurement error would be averaged out in the estimation of means, 
and in the regressions it would not affect the consistency of the parameter estimates as 
long as the misreported regressors are instrumented. 
To test the hypothesis of conditional symmetry, as stated above, we perform 
multiple regressions using OLS. The change in earnings from one year to the next is 
regressed on initial reported earnings, gender, age, education, sector transition, and 
geographic region. These explanatory variables were detailed in the previous subsection. 
Earnings variables are used in continuous forms. The regression equation is  
titiititi yZXy ,1,,, εδγφ +++∆=∆ −       (2) 
where X∆ denotes sector transitions, Z denotes time-invariant characteristics like gender, 
age, education, and region, and yi t-1 is initial reported income. Equation (2), which is a 
linear relationship among variables, is estimated through OLS regression. We also 
perform median regressions with bootstrapped standard errors to check whether outliers 
in the data excessively influence OLS estimates.  
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6. Empirical Findings
A.  Transition Matrices 
As a first analysis of the data, Tables 1A-1G present quintile transition matrices 
year by year.18  In most countries, the cells with the highest frequencies in quintile 
transition matrices are the 1-1 and 5-5 cells. Many times in Argentina, though, more 
people remain in the 2-2 cell than in the 1-1 cell. This is because the unemployment rates 
were so high (up to 23%) that all or nearly all of those who started in the lowest quintile 
initially had zero earnings, and the majority of them were found to be employed one year 
later. Otherwise, the quintile transition matrices in Argentina indicate substantial mobility 
between the three middle earnings quintiles. 
A potentially important determinant of earnings change is sector change – that is, 
whether a worker started formally employed and moved to informal employment, etc. 19 
Tables 2A-2G produce three patterns that hold for every year with one exception: (1) 
Most of the people who started formally employed remained formally employed. (2) 
Most of the people who started informally employed remained informally employed. (3) 
Most of the people who started unemployed were found to be employed one year later, 
the majority being found in the informal sector.20  
                                                 
18 Because of heaping, the Argentina data do not produce quintiles containing exactly twenty percent of the 
people. (“Heaping” refers to the tendency of respondents to report incomes in round numbers: 0, 100 pesos, 
200 pesos, etc.) 
 
19 The data set does not tell us whether those who remained employed in a given sector continued to work 
for the same employer or whether they changed employers. 
 
20 The one exception is that in Argentina’s economic crisis (2001-2002), 54% of those who were 
unemployed in May 2001 were found to be unemployed in May 2002. 
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B.  Tests of the Hypotheses 
H1: Unconditional Divergence of Earnings 
This hypothesis holds that in any given year, those individuals for whom initial 
reported earnings level is highest are those who experience the largest earnings gains and 
smallest earnings losses. We tested this hypothesis by looking at each of the seven panels 
from 1996-97 to 2002-03. The results year-by-year are summarized in Table 3; further 
details are given in  the top blocks of Tables 4A-4G. Unconditional divergence of initial 
reported earnings, expressed in quintiles, is decisively rejected. Rather, what we find in 
each case is statistically significant convergence. Thus, when reported earnings are used, 
it is the initially poorest who exhibit the largest gains. Please note that the gains of the 
poor are largest in pesos, which means of course that their percentage gains are even 
larger. 
To test the robustness of the conclusion that the pattern of earnings changes is 
convergent, we perform several tests. First, we use median earnings changes in place of 
mean earnings changes; these results are in Table 4A-4G. Second, we use initial 
predicted earnings in place of initial reported earnings. In the previous section, we 
described the six different predictions of initial earnings we use. As an example, the 
prediction equations including gender, age, education, and dwelling characteristics for all 
individuals (Method 1) are reported in Appendix Table 1. Also, the relationships between 
earnings change and quintiles of predicted earnings, according to Method 1 and the 
analogous method for those with positive earnings (Method 5) are reported in Tables 3 
and 4A-4G. The summary table below shows the results of univariate regressions of 
change in earnings on initial reported earnings and predicted earnings using all six 
methods.  
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Quintiles Linear
Initial Reported Earnings Always significantly negative Always significantly negative
Initial Predicted Earnings, 3 out of 7 years significantly negative 5 out of 7 years significantly negative
Limited Predictors 4 years, not significant 2 years, not significant
*
Initial Predicted Earnings, 6 out of 7 years significantly negative Always significantly negative
All predictors 1 year not significant
*
Initial Predicted Earnings, 4 out of 7 years significantly negative 5 out of 7 years significantly negative
Limited Predictors 3 years, not significant 2 years, not significant
Heckman Correction *
Initial Predicted Earnings, 3 out of 7 years significantly negative 3 out of 7 years significantly negative
All predictors 4 years, not significant 4 years, not significant
Heckman Correction *
Initial Predicted Earnings, 6 out of 7 years significantly negative Always significantly negative
Limited Predictors 1 year, not significant
Positive Earners Only *
Initial Predicted Earnings, 6 out of 7 years significantly negative Always significantly negative
All predictors 1 year, not significant
Positive Earners Only *
*Non-monotonic pattern
Regressions of Earnings Change on Reported Earnings and Six Measures of Predicted Earnings, 
Entered in Quintiles and Linearly
 
 
The results for the robustness tests are similar to those for the base tests in some 
respects but not in others. The results are the same in that unconditional divergence is 
never found. Also, when the results are statistically significant, the pattern is one of 
unconditional convergence. However, unlike the results for reported earnings, the results 
for predicted earnings are sometimes statistically insignificant.   
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H2: Unconditional Divergence with Other Welfare Indicators
This hypothesis holds that in any given year, those groups that earn the 
most are those that experience the largest earnings gains or the smallest earnings 
losses. To know which groups of workers are those with the highest welfare 
indicators, Table 5 displays the reported earnings levels for workers in different 
categories. We see that in both positive growth and negative growth years: men 
earn significantly more than women; middle-aged workers earn significantly more 
than others; earnings rise significantly with education; formal sector workers earn 
significantly more than informal workers; and workers in Greater Buenos Aires 
are at or near the top of the earnings distribution compared to workers in other 
regions. 
H2 would be confirmed for a given welfare indicator if the initially-high-
earners are the ones with the most positive or least negative earnings changes. In 
general, though, this is not what we find when we look at the data in Tables 3 and 
4A-4G. Rather, when statistically significant: 
• Men’s earnings changes are worse than women’s.  (H2 rejected) 
• Middle-aged  and older workers’ earnings changes are worse than 
those of younger workers. (H2 rejected) 
• Most of the time, those with higher education have the most 
negative earnings changes. (H2 rejected) 
• Most of the time workers who started formal have significantly 
worse earnings changes than workers who started informal. (H2 
rejected) 
Moreover, regional differences are statistically insignificant in six out of the seven 
panels. (H2 rejected) 
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In summary, when welfare indicators other than initial reported earnings are used, 
we find unconditional convergence or a statistically insignificant relationship; 
unconditional divergence is never found for these other welfare indicators. 
As we did for Hypothesis 1, we perform a robustness test of these results by 
analyzing median earnings changes. We find the same patterns using medians as we did 
using means and therefore reject unconditional divergence for all variables. 
 
H3: Symmetry of Gains and Losses, Unconditional Version
This hypothesis holds that when positive and negative growth years are compared, 
those groups for whom earnings changes are the most positive when the economy is 
growing are those that experience the largest earnings losses when the economy is 
contracting. Such a result, if found, will be termed “symmetric.” 
If symmetry is rejected, and the same groups gain significantly more regardless of 
whether the economy is growing or contracting, the pattern of gains and losses will be 
called “structural” as opposed to “symmetric.” A structural pattern could be further 
described as “convergent” or “divergent”. If the groups with the initial advantage (e.g., 
the highest quintile) have the biggest losses in recession and the smallest gains in growth, 
we would refer to this pattern as “convergent.” On the other hand, if the groups with the 
greatest initial advantage are getting ahead, we would consider this “divergent.” 
However, if the hypothesis is rejected because the gains for the different groups are not 
significantly different from one another in booms and/or busts, this pattern will be 
referred to as “insignificant.” 
Comparing the positive growth and negative growth periods in Table 6, we find 
that the patterns for some variables are structural and for others are insignificant. First, 
taking mean changes in reported earnings as the criterion for comparison, the hypothesis 
of symmetry of gains and losses is overwhelmingly rejected. Rather, by initial reported 
earnings quintile, the pattern does not vary with macroeconomic conditions. In both 
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positive growth and negative growth years, earnings changes fall significantly as initial 
earnings quintile rises. Therefore, the earnings at the top of the distribution and those at 
the bottom converge to the grand mean.   
We also test the hypothesis of symmetry using other measures of initial 
advantage. As already reported, in Argentina, men earn significantly more than women, 
prime-age individuals earn significantly more than others, earnings rise significantly with 
education, formal workers earn significantly more than informal sector workers, and the 
country displays significant regional differences. For these other indicators, the symmetry 
hypothesis also receives no support whatsoever. By gender, men do significantly worse 
than women in periods of negative growth, but the relationship is not significant in 
periods of positive growth.  By age and education, we see a significant relationship with 
change in earnings only in negative growth periods. In those periods, young people and 
the less educated gain significantly more than their initially more advantaged 
counterparts (prime-age individuals and the more educated respectively). 
The story changes when looking at sector transitions. For this variable, a strong 
and significant structural pattern appears. Those who started informal do significantly 
better than those who started formal in both positive growth and negative growth periods, 
furthering the evidence for convergence. 
Finally, the pattern is insignificant by region. Even though Argentina exhibits 
significant differences among regional earnings levels, we find no association between 
changes in earnings and region either in positive growth or in negative growth periods.  
To sum up, the main tests reveal no case of a symmetric relationship. Rather, all 
of the indicators, when statistically significant, exhibit structural relationships. 
Four robustness checks are performed. First, we repeat the analysis based on 
comparisons of median earnings changes rather than means.  Comparing the median 
columns of Table 6 with the mean columns of the same table, we find that the answers 
are essentially the same. That is, for the medians as for the means, those with higher 
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initial reported earnings and those who started formal had lower earnings changes, while 
no difference appears for the other variables.21  
We also do the analysis for initial predicted quintile instead of initial reported 
quintile. Once again, the symmetry hypothesis is rejected. No significant pattern is found 
because earnings changes are not associated with this measure of more permanent 
earnings in periods of positive growth.22
We perform another robustness test by analyzing a subsample of workers, leaving 
aside the unemployed (Table 7). The results remain the same as with the whole sample, 
i.e., there is no symmetric pattern for any of the variables. The patterns are either 
insignificant (gender, age, education level, and region) or structural (initial reported 
earnings and sector transition.) The structural patterns are structural in the same way for 
this subsample as for the full sample, i.e., individuals in the lower quintiles and those 
who started informal have larger earnings changes than individuals in the higher quintiles 
and than those who started formal, respectively. 
The last robustness test consists of analyzing formal sector workers and informal 
sector workers separately (Tables 8A-8B). Both for formal sector workers and for 
informal sector workers, the pattern is structural for initial reported earnings and 
insignificant for the remaining variables, which is what we found in the full sample.  
In summary, we find no evidence of unconditional symmetry of mobility patterns 
for any of the groups, either in the main tests or in the robustness tests. The hypothesis is 
rejected using mean and median changes in earnings, as well as using different 
                                                 
21 No difference appears for variables such as gender, education level, age, and region. The median changes 
of each category of these variables are zero. This is because almost half of the changes are positive, almost 
half are negative and the remaining 7 % are zero, and the median change in earnings is included in this 
small percentage of earnings changes that are equal to zero. The zero earnings changes correspond mostly 
to individuals who are unemployed in both periods. 
 
22  Of course, the validity of these results hinges on the construction of the measure of permanent earnings, 
which might not be accurate given the limited data available with which to predict earnings in the survey. 
(There is no information about assets, consumption, etc.)  
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subsamples of the population. For initial reported earnings and sector transitions, the 
patterns are structural: the initially less advantaged individuals in those two groups get 
ahead in periods of growth as well as in periods of recession. The other variables show no 
significant patterns. 
 
H4: Symmetry of Gains and Losses, Conditional Version
This hypothesis posits that, other things equal, when positive growth and negative 
growth years are compared, those groups for whom earnings changes are most positive 
when the economy is growing are those for whom earnings changes are the most negative  
when the economy is contracting. We test this hypothesis by comparing three panels 
covering periods of growth (1996-1998 and 2002-2003) pooled together and four panels 
in periods of recession (1998-2002) pooled together. Conditional tests of symmetry of 
gains and losses are performed using initial reported earnings in continuous form, gender, 
age and its square, years of education and its square, sector transition (with those who 
remain unemployed as the omitted category), and region.  
The results of the OLS multiple regressions for growth years pooled and 
recessionary years pooled are shown in Table 9.23  We also include the results of the OLS 
multiple regression for each of the seven years; see Table 10. The corresponding results 
for the median regressions with bootstrapped standard errors are presented in Tables 11 
and 12.  The general result is that patterns are overwhelmingly structural - that is, other 
things equal, those who gain the most when the economy is growing are for the most part 
also those who lose the least when the economy is contracting.  
Looking first at the OLS multiple regressions in Table 9, the relationship between 
initial reported earnings and earnings change is always significantly negative. This 
means that there is a convergent pattern to the conditional mean of reported earnings, i.e., 
                                                 
23 These are multiple regressions with OLS robust Huber-White correction for standard errors, allowing for 
heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form.  
 
 
34 
those with the highest initial reported earnings experience the worst changes in growth 
and in recession. Other things equal, men always have significantly higher earnings 
changes than women in both periods. In other words, being a male in urban Argentina 
leads to both higher earnings levels on average, and also to higher upward mobility, 
ceteris paribus. Other things equal, age has a positive and significant effect on earnings 
changes in both positive growth and negative growth years. The older the individual, the 
more positive earnings changes he/she experiences.  
When evaluated at the mean years of education (approximately nine years), those 
with more education have larger earnings gains, other things equal. A convex pattern is 
found, and the turning point for the education variables is around five years of schooling. 
Turning to the analysis of sector transitions, earnings changes among the stayers (formal-
formal and informal-informal) are always found to be significantly positive, ceteris 
paribus.24 Also, among the movers, informal-formal and formal-informal are always have 
significantly positive effects in the multiple regressions. Individuals moving from the 
informal sector into the formal sector have large positive earnings gains, larger than the 
gains of the workers who stayed in the informal sector. Individuals who started in the 
formal sector and moved to the informal sector experience lower earnings changes than 
those who stayed in the formal sector. As for transitions into and out of employment, 
losing a formal sector job entails larger earnings losses than losing an informal sector job. 
 Finally, in Table 9, the coefficients for region are significant. When comparing 
these panels, we reject the symmetry of mobility hypothesis once again. The pattern goes 
always in the same direction: earnings change in the region in question are less positive 
or more negative than in Greater Buenos Aires. 
                                                 
24 Note that the informal sector is very heterogeneous, including informal salaried workers and different kinds of self-
employed individuals.  
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 When we run regressions year-by-year instead, the results are mostly the same as 
the ones just described  for growth years pooled compared with recession years pooled; 
see Table 10. When significant, the structural patterns are the same as before with only 
one exception for sector transitions.  
 In summary, our main tests reveal structural patterns for all of the variables. 
Conditional symmetry is rejected without exception. 
 We turn now to our robustness tests. The first robustness test we perform is to 
use median regressions (Tables 11 and 12). The median regressions deliver the same 
answer to the conditional symmetry hypothesis as the OLS regressions did – namely, 
there is no symmetry of mobility.  
As a second robustness test, we restrict the sample of individuals with positive 
earnings in both periods. The results are reported in Table 13. As in the case of the main 
test, the conditional symmetry of mobility hypothesis is rejected when we analyze this 
sub-sample. For the most part, the patterns are the same as for the whole sample. We find 
structural patterns for initial reported earnings, gender, age, education, and region as 
before, but the pattern for sector transitions is insignificant in the subsample. (Sector 
transitions turn out not to be significant in growth years.) 
The last robustness test consists of dividing the sample into initially formal and 
initially informal workers and comparing the results with the ones from the whole sample 
(Tables 14 and 15). Again, we reject the symmetry hypothesis for all of the variables in 
each of the sub-samples. Instead, we find a structural pattern within both the formal and 
the informal sectors: the initially poor, men, the more experienced, the more educated, 
and those in Greater Buenos Aires have the largest earnings changes in growth as well as 
in recessionary years. 
In summary, contrary to the hypothesis of conditional symmetry of gains and 
losses, the results demonstrate predominantly a “structural” pattern or else an 
“insignificant” relationship. Conditional symmetry is decisively rejected. 
 
36 
 
H5: Comparing the Unconditional and Conditional Determinants of 
Earnings Changes 
This section analyzes whether the unconditional determinants of earnings changes 
are the same as the conditional ones in growth and recessionary years. First, we compare 
the statistical significance and sign of the variables in growth and recession. Second, we 
analyze their economic significance. 
Regarding statistical significance and sign, the results are summarized in Table 
16. We see that only one of the determinants of earnings changes is the same 
unconditionally and conditionally, and the others are not. The one that is always the same 
is initial reported earnings, which has a statistically significant negative sign. The other 
variables differ in sign or significance between the unconditional and conditional 
analysis, as follows. Gender, age, and education change signs and significance. Region 
changes from not significant unconditionally to significant conditionally. Sector change 
is always statistically significant but changes sign between the unconditional and the 
conditional analysis. 
The statistically significant unconditional determinants of earnings changes are 
initial reported earnings and sector transitions in growth and recessionary years. Gender, 
age, and education are statistically significant in recession but not in growth. Region is 
not statistically significant in any period. When the variables are statistically significant, 
those with higher unconditional earnings changes were: the poor, women, the young, the 
less educated, and the ones who started informal. 
Turning to the conditional results, all explanatory variables are statistically 
significant in growth and recessionary years. Those with higher conditional earnings 
changes are: the poor, men, older workers, the more educated, the ones who ended 
formal, and those in Greater Buenos Aires.  
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To sum up the results on statistical significance, initial reported earnings is the 
only variable which keeps its statistical significance and sign, in both the unconditional 
and the conditional analysis and in both periods. All the other variables flip signs or 
become significant when we go from the unconditional analysis to the full conditional 
regression. 
To gain more insight about why and when the signs or the significance of the 
coefficients change, we add an intermediate step between the univariate and the full 
conditional regression. We run regressions with two explanatory variables and ask what 
the effect of Xj is when we control for Xk.  For example, we analyze five different 
regressions of change in earnings on initial reported earnings (Xj) by adding different 
Xk’s each time (gender, age, education, change in sector, or region) to a univariate 
regression. When we regress change in earnings on initial reported earnings and one other 
explanatory variable, we always get a significantly negative coefficient on initial reported 
earnings. However, all the other variables exhibit a change in sign or significance in the 
transition from the unconditional to the conditional analysis with initial reported earnings 
included. Most of the time, sign flips and changes in significance do not appear in the 
absence of initial reported earnings. The only exception is the case of sector transitions in 
periods of recession, which exhibit change in sign when we add education variables.  
There are two important conclusions to draw regarding statistical significance. 
First, the coefficient for initial reported earnings is significantly negative in all of the 
regressions. The initially poor benefit the most in periods of growth and recession, 
whether conditionally or unconditionally.  Secondly, it is nearly always the case that in 
going from an unconditional regression to a conditional one, initial reported earnings is 
essential for the change in sign in the variables to take place and for the coefficients to 
become significant (if they were not already so.) This result arises because there are two 
offsetting effects of variables such as gender, age, and education. On the one hand, being 
a man, more experienced, or more educated raises base year earnings, and those 
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individuals with higher base year earnings have smaller earnings gains. On the other 
hand, once base year earnings are controlled for, men, the more experienced, or the more 
educated have more positive earnings gains. The coefficients of unconditional regressions 
show the total effect of a variable on changes in earnings, while the coefficients of 
conditional regressions show the partial effect of a variable.  
Turning from statistical to economic significance, the results are summarized in 
Table 17.  Unconditional economic significance is gauged by the R-squareds of simple 
regressions; conditional economic significance is gauged by the factor inequality weights 
coming from the Fields decomposition. (This methodology was explained in Section 5.) 
We see that the economically significant variables in the conditional analysis are the 
same as in the unconditional analysis. Despite the statistical significance of all 
explanatory variables in the multiple regression, only two variables turn out to be 
economically significant. They are initial reported earnings and sector transitions. In the 
conditional analysis, the weights are 0.16 in growth years and 0.33 in recessionary years 
for initial reported earnings, and 0.04 in growth and recession for sector transitions. In the 
unconditional analysis, the R-squareds were 0.13 in growth years and 0.27 in 
recessionary years on initial reported earnings, and 0.06 in growth years and 0.05 in 
recession for the regressions on sector transitions. The magnitude of the R-squareds show 
that initial reported earnings is much more important in explaining earnings changes than 
are sector transitions. Gender, age, education, and region are not economically significant 
in any of the analyses.  
In summary, the conditional determinants of earnings changes are sometimes the 
same as the unconditional ones and sometimes not. One determinant (initial reported 
earnings) is always statistically and economically significant. For the other determinants, 
the results change sign and statistical significance. Turning from statistical significance to 
economic significance, initial reported earnings is always the most important determinant 
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of earnings change, sector change is always the second most important determinant, and 
all other determinants are economically insignificant. 
 
C. Determinants of the Determinants 
We have found that the most important determinant of earnings change is initial 
earnings level. Ample research on Argentina has shown that the variables we have used 
in our analysis (gender, age, education, sector, and region) are significant determinants of 
earnings levels (Beccaria and Orsatti, 1979; Cid and Paz, 2002; Monza,1989). 
The other important determinant of earnings change in our analysis is sector 
change. We use ordered logits to analyze what are the determinants of sector change for 
initially unemployed, initially informal, and initially informal individuals. Ordered logit 
models are used to estimate relationships between an ordinal dependent variable and a set 
of independent variables. The ordinal dependent variable, which is ordered and 
categorical, is the sector of employment in the final year (unemployed, employed in the 
informal sector, or employed in the formal sector.) The independent variables we use are: 
gender, experience (age and age-squared), schooling (years of education and years of 
education-squared), region (Pampeana, Patagonica, Cuyo, Noreste, Noroeste, Greater 
Buenos Aires), and initial reported earnings (when applicable, i.e., initially employed 
individuals.) We have one regression for each of the three possible initial states: 
unemployed, formal sector, and informal sector. We do the analysis separately for 
periods of growth and for periods of recession. 
The results are reported in Table 18. We find some statistically significant 
variables, but we do a poor job of explaining the variance of sector transitions using 
gender, age, education, and region. The pseudo R-squared values of the regressions range 
from half of one percent to four percent in growth and recessionary years.  
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7.  Reconciling Mobility with Inequality Change: An Explanation
In this research, we have found that the pattern of income changes in Argentina 
was convergent in every period. Specifically, from one year to the next, those individuals 
who started with the highest incomes were found to have gained the fewest pesos or to 
have lost the most while those who started with the lowest incomes gained the most 
pesos. At the same time, our calculations, like those of others (e.g., Gasparini, 2004), 
show that income inequality was sometimes increasing, sometimes decreasing, and 
sometimes remaining unchanged. (Consistent with the literature, we are measuring 
inequality relatively, using Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients.) 
The reader may be puzzled how convergent income changes are consistent with 
inequality that can be rising, remaining the same, or falling. We begin with some 
examples and then move on to the actual data. 
 
A.  A First Example 
The first example is one presented earlier. Suppose that we have a two-person 
economy in which the anonymous distributions of income are (1, 5) in the base period 
and (1, 5) in the final period. Furthermore, suppose that the two constituent individuals 
swap incomes between the base and final periods. We shall adopt the notation that a 
vector of pairs of observations for the various individuals is written in square brackets. 
Thus, the swapping of incomes is denoted [1, 5], [5, 1]. In this example, the patterns of 
change are completely convergent, yet inequality is unchanged. 
 
B. A Second Group of Examples
The second group of examples involves patterns in twelve-person economies in 
which some persons change incomes. In each case, the initial distribution of income is  
(1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3).   
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In the first of these examples, the final distribution of income is exactly the same 
as the original distribution: (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3). However, there is movement 
of individuals within the distributions. The pairs of base year and final year income for 
the twelve constituent individuals are as follows:  
[1, 1], [1, 1], [1, 2], [1, 3], [2, 1], [2, 2], [2, 2], [2, 3], [3, 1], [3, 2], [3, 3], [3, 3]. (1) 
For the three initial thirds, the distribution of mean changes works out to be: 
 Lowest third:  +0.75 
 Middle third:       0 
 Top third:  -0.75 
Thus, a convergent pattern is observed despite the fact that the anonymous distribution is 
unchanged. 
Suppose instead that the anonymous income distribution had doubled between 
base year and final year, so that the final distribution became  
(2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4, 6, 6, 6, 6).  Suppose that the pairs of base year and final year 
incomes followed a pattern similar to (1), but with all final year incomes doubled:  
[1, 2], [1, 2], [1, 4], [1, 6], [2, 2], [2, 4], [2, 4], [2, 6], [3, 2], [3, 4], [3, 6], [3, 6].  (2) 
For the three initial thirds, the distribution of mean changes is calculated as: 
 Lowest third:  +2.5 
 Middle third:     +2 
 Top third:  +1.5 
Once again, a convergent pattern is found despite unchanged inequality. 
Finally, suppose that the economy had suffered a 50% recession, again spread 
proportionally across all incomes. The anonymous income distribution in the final year is 
then (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5).  Assigning the panel people according 
to patterns analogous to (1) and (2), we have that the pairs of initial and final year 
incomes are: 
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[1, 0.5], [1, 0.5], [1, 1], [1, 1.5], [2, 0.5], [2, 1], [2, 1], [2, 1.5], [3, 0.5], [3, 1], [3, 1.5], [3, 1.5].   
           (3)  
For the three initial thirds, the distribution of mean changes is: 
 Lowest third:   -0.125 
 Middle third:    -1 
 Top third:   -1.875 
All groups lose but the initially poor lose the least. In this case too, despite unchanged 
inequality, a convergent pattern is found. 
The preceding examples show how it is possible for initial and final-year 
inequality to be identical and yet for the pattern of changes to be convergent, whereby the 
most positive or least negative changes are for the initially-poorest people and the least 
positive or most negative changes are for the initially-richest people. 
 
C.  Actual Data for Argentina, 2001-2002 
The third application is for actual data from Argentina for the period 2001-2002. 
During that time, inequality increased sharply, both according to the Lorenz curve, which 
shifted outward (Figure 2), and according to the Gini coefficient, which rose from 0.53 to 
0.58. Yet the pattern of changes was found to be convergent: 
 
Initial Earnings Quintile 
 (Quintile 1 = Lowest) 
Mean Income Change of Those Who 
Started In That Quintile 
Quintile 1 164 
Quintile 2 -65 
Quintile 3 -127 
Quintile 4 -214 
Quintile 5 -606 
Let us now show explicitly how the rising Gini coefficient and the convergent 
pattern of changes are mutually compatible in the Argentine data for 2001-2002. To do 
this, we simulate the base and final year distributions for twenty-five illustrative 
individuals and show that the simulated Ginis are very close to the actual ones.  
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For the initial Gini, we selected individuals at the fifth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, 
seventy-fifth, and ninety-fifth percentiles of each of the five quintiles in 2001. The 
calculated Gini for these twenty-five individuals is 0.52, quite close to the actual initial 
value of 0.53. The reason that we do not get exactly the same Gini is that the simulation 
is based on 25 people rather than 7,936.  
The simulation of the final year Gini proceeds as follows. We assign five people 
the income at the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% points in the distribution of their initial 
quintile. We then assign these people the distributions of changes at the 1%, 25%, 50%, 
75%, and 99% of the changes for their specific quintile, but in reverse order of 
magnitude, consistent with the convergent mobility patterns that we have encountered. 
For example, the income at the 5% point in the distribution of the first quintile is matched 
with the change at the 99% point in the distribution of the changes for that specific 
quintile. In the case of the first quintile, these levels and changes are, respectively: 
 
Distribution of Earnings Level  
within Quintile 1 
Earnings Level 
Fifth percentile of quintile 1  0 
Twenty-fifth percentile of quintile 1  0 
Fiftieth percentile of quintile 1 0 
Seventy-fifth percentile of quintile 1 0 
Ninety-fifth percentile of quintile 1 100 
 
Distribution of Earnings Change 
within Quintile 1 
Earnings Change 
First percentile of quintile 1  -100 
Twenty-fifth percentile of quintile 1  0 
Fiftieth percentile of quintile 1 0 
Seventy-fifth percentile of quintile1 169 
Ninety-ninth percentile of quintile 1 2115 
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The simulated final year incomes are then: 
 
Final Year Quintile 1 Simulated Final Year Earnings 
(earnings changes assigned in inverse 
order to earnings levels) 
First simulated individual  0 + 2115 = 2115 
Second simulated individual 0 + 169 = 169 
Third simulated individual 0 + 0 = 0 
Fourth simulated individual 0 + 0 = 0 
Fifth simulated individual 100 - 100 = 0 
Similarly, in the case of the second quintile, the five base levels, the five changes, and the 
simulated initial incomes are, respectively: 
 
Distribution of Earnings Level  
within Quintile 2 
Level 
Fifth percentile of quintile 2  120 
Twenty-fifth percentile of quintile 2  189 
Fiftieth percentile of quintile 2 240 
Seventy-fifth percentile of quintile2 300 
Ninety-fifth percentile of quintile 2 300 
 
 
Distribution of Earnings Change 
within Quintile 2 
Change 
First percentile of quintile 2 -300 
Twenty-fifth percentile of quintile 2 -150 
Fiftieth percentile of quintile 2 -47 
Seventy-fifth percentile of quintile2 -4 
Ninety-ninth percentile of quintile 2 311 
  
Final Year Quintile 2 Final Year Income 
Sixth simulated individual 120 + 311 = 431 
Seventh simulated individual 189 - 4 = 185  
Eighth simulated individual 240 – 47 = 193 
Ninth simulated individual 300 – 150 = 150 
Tenth simulated individual 300 – 300 = 0 
The simulations for the other quintiles proceed analogously. (Note: Any simulated 
income that was negative was converted to a zero.) 
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Once we obtained these twenty-five simulated incomes, we calculated the Gini 
coefficient of the simulated final year distribution. This Gini was found to be 0.58, which 
is the same as the actual final year Gini.  That is, when we take account of five values of 
the quintile-specific initial distribution and the quintile-specific distribution of changes, 
we arrive at a simulated income distribution for 2002 that is the same as the actual one. 
Recall that for the base year (2001), the simulated distribution produced a Gini of 
0.52, when the actual Gini was 0.53. Thus, using twenty-five individuals drawn from the 
actual Argentine income distribution for 2001 and twenty-five changes drawn from the 
actual distribution of changes between 2001 and 2002, we have come been able to 
reproduce both the rising inequality that took place and the convergent pattern of income 
changes that also took place. 
It bears mention that although this simulation is right on the mark, a simpler 
simulation would not have worked. If we had taken the mean incomes of each of the five 
initial quintiles and applied the mean change for members of the respective quintile, the 
resulting distribution of income would have been  
 
Quintile 
 (Quintile 1 = Lowest) 
Simulated Income Using the 
Simpler Simulation 
Quintile 1 17 + 164 = 181 
Quintile 2 229 – 65 = 164 
Quintile 3  424 – 127 = 297 
Quintile 4  669 – 214 = 455 
Quintile 5  1561 – 606 = 955 
 
The Gini coefficient of this simpler simulated distribution is 0.36, which is way too low 
compared to the actual final year value of 0.58. The primary reasons that this simpler 
simulation understates inequality are that: 1) it does not generate incomes that are 
sufficiently high at the top end, because it fails to recognize the inequality of changes 
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within the top income quintile, and 2) it does not generate zero incomes at the bottom end 
for those who became unemployed.  
In summary, these examples show that when initial quintile mean incomes are 
combined with an appropriate distribution of initial-quintile-specific changes, the 
simulated final-year inequality values essentially match the actual ones. What this means 
is that the change in anonymous inequality is providing one type of information while the 
distribution of the changes in income for named individuals is providing another. Both 
pieces of information are true. They are, however, different. 
 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have asked who gained the most when the Argentine economy 
grew, who lost the most when the economy contracted, and whether those who started 
rich were getting richer in growth periods and losing more in recessions than those who 
started poor. We performed unconditional and conditional tests for the years 1996-1997 
to 2002-2003 in all urban Argentina, considering women and men aged 25-60 who 
participated in the labor market in both periods of the panel. The unconditional 
divergence hypothesis is always rejected. Rather, for reported earnings, statistically 
significant convergence is found in every year, and for other welfare indicators, the 
relationship is either one of unconditional convergence or statistical insignificance.  We 
find that when the differences between groups are significant, those groups that earn the 
most in the base year are those that experience the smallest earnings gains or largest 
earnings losses.  The statistically significant convergent pattern holds regardless of 
whether economy-wide inequality, gauged by Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients, was 
rising, remaining the same, or falling. These results hold up to a number of robustness 
tests, including the use of medians in place of means and the use of initial predicted 
earnings in place of initial reported earnings.  
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As for the symmetry of mobility hypotheses, the results offer no support for either 
the unconditional or the conditional version. We summarize these results in turn. 
The unconditional analyses of mean and median earnings changes show a strong 
structural pattern when both mean and median earnings changes are used - that is, those 
who gain the most when the economy is growing are also those who gain the most (or 
lose the least) when the economy is contracting. Specifically, convergence is found for 
initial reported earnings and sector transitions. For the rest of the variables, the pattern is 
insignificant in positive growth periods. In no case do those who gain the most when the 
economy is growing lose the most when the economy is contracting. In short, the 
unconditional symmetry hypothesis does not hold for Argentina.  
Conditional symmetry receives no support either. In the conditional case, the 
general result is that the patterns are structural, i.e., other things equal, those individuals 
who started poor are getting ahead faster and converging to their conditional mean. 
Gender, age, education, sector transitions, and region are also structural. These 
unconditional and conditional results for the full sample are robust to number of 
alternative specifications: using median regression in place of mean regression, using just 
the individuals employed in both periods, and analyzing informal and formal workers 
separately.  
In both the unconditional and conditional analysis, the variables that are both 
statistically and economically significant determinants of earnings change are initial 
earnings and sector transition; the variables that are mostly statistically significant but 
economically insignificant are gender, age, and education; and the variable that is mostly 
statistically insignificant and always economically insignificant is geographic region. 
Given the importance of sector transitions, both statistically and economically, we 
looked for the determinants of sector change for initially unemployed, initially informal, 
and initially formal individuals. We found some statistically significant variables, but did 
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a poor job explaining the variance of sector transitions using gender, age, education, and 
region.  
After reporting these results, we explained in detail how convergent mobility is 
consistent with increasing inequality in the case of Argentina.  
We have found that the use of panel data adds a whole new dimension to our 
understanding of winners and losers in Argentina. In the future, researchers would do 
well to perform both panel data analysis and cross-section analysis. It would be helpful if 
the data base were extended beyond urban Argentina to cover rural areas as well. 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of GDP in Argentina 
(Billions of pesos at 1993) 
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Figure 2. 
Year-to-Year Comparisons of Lorenz Curves for Earnings of Individuals Aged 25-60  
in the Labor Force in Two Successive Periods in All Urban Argentina* 
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Figure 3 
Illustrations of Divergent, Convergent, and Symmetric Growth Patterns 
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